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Abstract—Seaports and waterways are crucial for 
international trade, and damage to them may cost 
millions to the global economy. In the past, Malaysia 
has been threatened and attacked by terrorists, and 
pirates have hijacked ships near the coasts of the 
Strait of Malacca and the South China Sea. Such acts 
can negatively affect the country’s maritime supply 
chain. This paper analyses the risk to Malaysia’s 
maritime supply chain security in ports and 
waterways by applying a risk assessment matrix. The 
findings show that Malaysian ports are vulnerable to 
attacks and crime due to various factors. Also, 
Malaysia’s waterways may always be at risk given the 
country’s geographical location and status as one of 
the most important trade routes in the world. 
Mitigating the risk to ports and waterways can be 
accomplished by investing in more advanced security 
equipment, eliminating corruption, and increasing the 
military presence in the Strait of Malacca. This study 
may be able to help to increase ports’ policy-makers’ 
preparation and decision-making.  
Keywords— Maritime supply chain, Seaport, Maritime 
Logistics, Risk management, Security, Waterways.  
 
1. Introduction 
The terror attacks of September 11, 2001, were a 
wake-up call for governments, prompting them to 
strengthen their security in airports and seaports. 
The attacks resulted in the closure of US airspace 
and seaports and caused all airplanes to be 
grounded, halting the movement of goods. In 
general, the disruption in the supply chain caused 
problems for businesses. For example, Ford Motors 
was forced to stop production and assembly lines as 
lorries loaded with components were delayed at the 
Mexican and Canadian borders [1].  
After 9/11, the US government launched several 
initiatives, such as the Container Security Initiative 
(CSI), Customs-Trade Partnership Against 
Terrorism (C-TPAT), Free and Secure Trade and 
Operations Safe Commerce to tighten and secure 
its borders. Even though these initiatives were 
beneficial to trade security, the international 
community became quite concerned about how 
they would impact trade efficiency and cost. The 
US estimated that the cost of the new security 
measures would reach approximately 151 billion 
USD per annum [2]. Furthermore, some of these 
initiatives require close collaboration with foreign 
manufacturers and logistics providers to develop 
secure global supply chains. Under such 
circumstances, balancing security and efficiency is 
necessary, and this has generated some problems 
for managers of domestic and international markets 
and businesses. Most managers are still very unsure 
about the actions needed to enhance their 
respective logistics security programmes [3]. 
The current rise of global competition in the 
maritime industry requires much attention from 
port risk managers due to the increase in terror 
threats. Proper management of security has become 
a competitive advantage for companies. Moreover, 
reducing unexpected losses to maximise overall 
benefits has also been a factor in securing a 
competitive advantage. Seaports and the maritime 
industry are regarded as supply chain components 
with high uncertainty [4]. A port disruption is 
defined as an occurrence which causes 
interruptions to the flow within the transportation 
system, which may eventually halt the movement 
of cargo [5]. Such events may cause long delays in 
cargo flows at seaports, which will have unpleasant 
effects on various elements of the supply chain.  
Port Klang and the Port of Tanjung Pelepas are 
Malaysia’s two major ports. Both are strategically 
located on one of the busiest sea routes, the Strait 
of Malacca, which links Northeast and Southeast 
Asia to Western Europe, Asia and North America. 
This route is very dangerous as it is threatened by 
pirates, who can create supply chain disruptions. 
The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), set up by the 
US and nine other countries including Malaysia, 
intends to lower trade barriers to promote and ease 
the import and export of goods and services. The 
agreement itself could cover almost 40% of the 
global economy. There is a need to determine the 
usefulness of the implemented security initiatives 
in terms of their completion and efficiency [6]. Any 
burdensome customs or security measures can 
influence port operations and maritime supply ______________________________________________________________ 
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chain efficiency, leading to vast contraction in 
efficiency and trade [7].  
This research examines risk reduction efforts in 
ports and waterways intended to protect Malaysia’s 
maritime supply chain from terrorism and piracy. 
Furthermore, it assesses the risks to Malaysia’s 
maritime supply chain security and suggests 
various improvements. Section 2 reviews the 
relevant literature. The methodology is presented in 
Section 3, whilst Section 4 lists the main findings. 
Concluding remarks are found in Section 5.  
    
2. Literature Review 
Managing supply chain risk involves identifying 
and minimising vulnerabilities by negotiating 
between members of the chain. Global logistics 
will always be exposed to collaboration costs, 
ineffective execution, poor-quality products, supply 
and demand risks and environmental risks [8]. 
There is always a trade-off between security and 
efficiency; therefore, security interruptions have 
always occurred at various points within the supply 
chain process, which decreases its efficiency [9]. 
Willis and Ortiz [10] suggested five capabilities—
reliability, efficiency, transparency, resilience and 
fault tolerance—that help create a high level of 
security in the global supply chain. Supply chain 
security takes into account both information and 
physical flows from the origin point to the 
customers [11]. Supply chain security management 
is defined as a function of procedures, policies and 
forms of technology. It protects the assets of the 
supply chain (e.g. facilities, equipment, personnel 
and information) from thievery, damage and 
terrorism by preventing any unauthorised people, 
contraband or weapons from entering the chain 
[12]. Supply chain security involves using policies, 
procedures and modern technology to prevent 
illegal acts such as robbery, terror threats and 
unauthorised acts within the process [13].  
As for the maritime industry, its supply chains are 
very prone to terror attacks and other forms of 
disturbance due to their complexity and open 
nature, both nationally and globally [14]. Any form 
of disruption within the maritime supply chain will 
have negative implications for the global/local 
economy and world trade [15]. It has been 
predicted that any form of disruption in a port will 
cause 100 billion USD to be lost, with the port 
closure and recovery cost at around 5.8 billion 
USD. It will also lead to a domino effect, with the 
potential for a global economic downturn or the 
breakdown/disruption of the global supply chain 
[16]. Being a focal point of global business, the 
security of ports is arguably the most important 
way to ensure efficiency and smoothness in every 
intermodal logistics and supply chain facing ever-
increasing complexities [17]. A well-secured port 
means having a secure supply chain, leading to the 
smooth movement of goods and proper operation 
of global business.  
The importance of many Asian ports in today’s 
global trade landscape illustrates the need for 
security. Asian countries must comply with various 
mandatory international requirements in regard to 
port security, and one of them is the International 
Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code [18]. 
The ISPS Code, adopted by the International 
Maritime Organisation (IMO) right after the 
September 11 attacks, is now the most important 
international regulation which emphasises the 
importance of maritime security and provides better 
protection for port facilities and ships against 
terrorism [19]. The main purpose of the ISPS Code 
is to help address weakness or vulnerability in 
maritime supply chain security which is due to the 
lack of preventive measures as well as slow 
responses after an attack; there is basically an 
ineffective and poor crisis system in place [20]. 
The code guides and addresses maritime security 
and supply chains, including ports under the ISPS 
Code. The main objectives of the code are 1) 
identifying and detecting any potential security 
risks; 2) implementing security measures; 3) 
collecting and providing information in relation to 
maritime security; 4) providing a reliable method 
for assessing any maritime-related risk; 5) 
developing a detailed security plan in the presence 
of a variable security level; and 6) establishing 
roles and security in relation to security for ship 
companies, contracting governments and port 
operators.  
Malaysia implemented the ISPS Code back in 
2004, with 500 ships and 80 port facilities having 
to comply [21]. Legislation regarding the 
implementation of the code has been incorporated 
into the ‘Merchant Shipping Ordinance’ and the 
Malaysian Marine Department, which is the 
designated authority, has recommended that each 
port establish its own security committee. Another 
international regulation created with the security of 
supply chains in mind is the C-TPAT, which is a 
voluntary/government program that works together 
with Customs and Border Protection (CBD). Both 
focus on gathering sufficient information on 
various import shipments to create risk-based 
examinations as opposed to completely physical 
inspections and examinations. The C-TPAT 
regulation reviews the following eight areas of 
supply chains: 
 
1) Physical security: a) the listing of activities, 
facilities and hours of operation; b) the 
installation of security devices, 
2) Physical access control: to control access by 
visitors, employees, vehicles and vendors, 
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3) Personal security: establish policies when it 
comes to hiring, verification of citizenship, 
termination procedures, background checks 
and employee misconduct, 
4) Information security: policies for passwords, 
user ID, internet access, emails, and hardware 
and software security, 
5) Procedural security: policies for overage and 
shortages, receiving and shipping hazardous 
materials, recordkeeping, document viewing, 
and warehouse security, 
6) Security training: policies in relation to the C-
TPAT, security and safety training, and any 
related measures, 
7) Conveyance security: policies for the control 
of containers, the inspection of seals and 
container storage, and 
8) Business partner requirements: policies in 
relation to selecting, managing and evaluating 
brokers, suppliers, carriers and warehouses.  
 
The C-TPAT program allows the CBD to work 
alongside businesses with the purpose of 
strengthening the international supply chain and 
improving border security in the US. Malaysia and 
Singapore already abide by the C-PTAT and have 
increased their awareness of and protection from 
disruptions [19]. Ports are relying more and more 
on the usage of information technology (IT) for 
various purposes, like communicating with 
connecting ships, container tracking, and 
equipment maintenance and management [22]. 
Technology related attacks on ports can take many 
forms and often involve the disruption of 
electricity, which is devastating to energy-reliant 
ports or terminals. Sabotage can come from 
employees, a breach in port IT security, or even 
just an accident due to mishandling of dangerous or 
hazardous materials [23]. The Baltic and 
International Maritime Council developed its own 
advice for countering cyber threats to the shipping 
industry, which was discussed at the IMO Safety 
Committee in 2016. Many systems designed before 
the existence of cybersecurity were running old 
software on badly designed hardware, and these 
systems are still running in some container 
terminals and ports today, increasing the risk of a 
cyber-attack.  
The Strait of Malacca is a major choke point which 
is vulnerable to disruptions in the maritime supply 
chain [24]. It is thought that pirates only hijack or 
attack vessels out on the high seas, but that 
definition of pirates or piracy is now completely 
inaccurate, since they are spreading out from the 
high seas [25]. A staggering 80% of pirate attacks 
occur within territorial waters and even in ports 
themselves; such attacks fall outside the definition 
of piracy and do not qualify under the piracy act of 
the United Nations 1982 Convention [26]. 
Disruptions to various supply chains do not only 
occur within the Strait of Malacca but also within 
the nearby ports. It is estimated that 146 out of 242 
reported piracy attacks occurred within port areas 
worldwide [18]. 
The recent ruling by The Hague against China’s 
claims over territories in the South China Sea 
created uncertainty about the maritime industry and 
global supply chain. Any form of disruption to the 
shipping industry within the South China Sea could 
negatively impact global commerce, including 
energy supplies [27]. Thousands of vessels pass 
through the South China Sea every day, as it 
connects East Asia with the Middle East and 
Europe, and total yearly trade through the disputed 
waterway is estimated to be around 5.3 trillion 
USD [28]. Furthermore, a third of the world’s 
petroleum and liquefied natural gas passes through 
the Malacca Strait and continues on through the 
South China Sea [30]. Detouring to avoid conflicts 
will increase shipping costs, and the maritime 
industry has expressed concern over the possibility 
of an increase in insurance rates [6].  
 
3. Methodology 
To evaluate and assess the risks to and security 
of the Malaysian maritime supply chain, this 
study used a questionnaire survey to collect data. 
Then, as the main methodology, a risk/loss 
exposure matrix was employed. A risk/loss 
exposure matrix is an effective method for 
evaluating the risk of any type of organisation, 
firm or supply chain. Yang [30] adopted this 
method to assess Taiwan’s maritime supply 
chain security. The questionnaire was composed 
of two sections. The first attempted to determine 
the importance of security risks in terms of risk 
frequency and risk severity. The questionnaire 
used five-point Likert scales to rate risk 
frequency and risk severity; with regard to risk 
frequency, see Table 1. The questionnaire was 
distributed to Port Klang, the Port of Tanjung 
Pelepas and the Port of Singapore, which are 
located within the crucial Strait of Malacca. The 
intended respondents were senior-level managers 
who worked for terminal operators and port 
authorities. A total of 178 questionnaires were 
distributed, and 29 were returned. All 
respondents were working as senior managers. 
The alternatives in risk management can be 
classified by the level of risk exposure: self-
retention is utilised for low-level risks; insurance 
transfers and risk retention for medium risks; 
loss of control for high-level risks; and non-
insurance transfers and risk avoidance for a very 
intense risk. Exposure avoidance involves 
making the decision to eliminate a particular 
operation, activity or asset due to intense risk and 
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an increased frequency of loss factors. Loss 
control encompasses both loss reduction and loss 
prevention; it seeks to reduce the severity of 
losses after an occurrence. Contract transfer risk 
is transferrable to anyone, though only through a 
non-insurance contract or the purchase of 
insurance. Self-retention includes the expenses 
related to the loss, unfunded loss reserves, loans 
taken out to pay for losses, a well-funded loss 
reserve and utilisation of an insurer. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. Scale of risk frequency and risk severity  
Degree of frequency Scale Degree of severity 
Very unlikely 1 No disruption 
Possible but unlikely 2 Potential minor disruption 
Somewhat likely to occur 3 Possibility of moderate disruption 
Will be experienced 4 Possibility of disruption 
Likely to occur 5 Disruption is likely 
Based on a rigorous literature review, the 
questionnaire was divided into four sections: 
maritime threats, government intervention, 
cybersecurity and facility (Table 2).  
The current study used a regional case study of the 
Strait of Malacca including issues of piracy and the 
South China Sea dispute, unlike previous research 
that focused on CSI, ISPS and C-TPAT. Sixteen 
key factors were identified and divided into four 
sub-factors, equally distributed under piracy and 
terrorism factors (A1-A4), government intervention 
(B1-B4), cybersecurity (C1-C4) and facility (D1-
D4).  
Table 2. Risk assessment factors 
Risk assessment factors References 
A. Piracy and Terrorism 
1. Maritime risk control and analysis of the respective port is useful in today's world. 
2. Port and anchorage crimes have always been an issue in ports; such activities always occur in the respective ports. 
3. Terror threats and attacks are very common in today's global environment; the current status of the respective ports makes them 
vulnerable to such attacks. 
4. The Malacca Strait is considered as one of the most pirate-infested waterways in the world and creates serious operational issues for 
ports situated nearby. 
 
[31] 
[32] 
[33] 
 
[32] 
B. Government Intervention 
1. Government interventions in the safety and security of pirate-infested waterways have significant impacts and are effective. 
2. Government security regulations and law wills not be enough to counter maritime crime. 
3. The International Ship and Port Facility Security Code was specifically tailored to protect the maritime industry from external 
threats and is considered effective towards the respective ports. 
4. Collaboration between neighbouring countries to minimize the presence of piracy in the Strait of Malacca is still ongoing and seems 
to be effective. 
 
[34] 
[35] 
[21] 
 
[35] 
C. Cyber security 
1. We constantly update/upgrade our security network. 
2. We share information regarding threats to neighbouring ports/ government bodies. 
3. Cyber threats are common in today's global environment; there is the possibility of ports’ Global Navigational Satellite systems and 
Global Positioning Systems being disrupted by jammers. 
4. The possibility of ports’ information technology systems being hacked and disrupted. 
 
[23] 
[23] 
[22] 
 
[22] 
D. Facility 
1. Security equipment in ports can sometimes be under-utilised. We constantly utilise security equipment in our port. 
2. Only 4% of containers coming into the US are checked via X-rays and physical inspection; the X-ray machines within the 
respective ports are always fully utilised. 
3. Container flows within the respective ports can be quickly conciliated after a disruption. 
4. The possibility of container theft (seal breakage) within the respective port is high. 
 
[36] 
[37] 
 
[5] 
[18] 
 
4. Results 
Table 3 presents the level of frequency and severity 
for all three ports analysed. The numbers (risk score) 
in the table were acquired by multiplying the 
frequency and severity; for example, 2*2 = 4, 3*4 = 
12 and 5*5 = 25. The frequency utilised a scale from 
1 = ‘strongly disagree’ to 5 = ‘strongly agree’. The 
severity also utilised a scale from 1 = ‘negligible’ to 
5 = ‘catastrophic’. The table also uses colour coding 
to illustrate the risk and danger. Table 4 shows the 
description of each colour and risk. The light grey 
colour represents a very low risk, which means port 
operators or authorities view it as an important factor 
but the possibility of a disruption is fairly low. As for 
the colour yellow, it represents low risk, which 
means the possibility of a disruption by any threat 
can happen at any time, but if it does there is a 
chance to quickly mitigate losses. Orange represents 
moderate risk, which means port operators and  
 
 
authorities view it as an important factor, and 
protecting it is important to operation flows and 
security. Failure to do so will pose threats which can 
disrupt supply chain operations. Lastly, the colour 
red represents high risk. This means that when an 
accident or issue occurs, a report must be made as 
soon as possible. Disruption to port operations and 
the supply chain will happen, and this may influence 
international trade and port operations negatively to 
an immense degree. Sufficient time is needed to deal 
with the disruption.  
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Table 3. Risk table  
 Frequency 
Strongly Disagree (1) Disagree (2) Neutral (3) Agree (4) Strongly Agree (5) 
Severity Negligible (1) 1 2 3 4 5 
Minor (2) 2 4 6 8 10 
Moderate (3) 3 6 9 12 15 
Critical (4) 4 8 12 16 20 
Catastrophic (5) 5 10 15 20 25 
Source: Authors 
 
Table 4. Risk table description 
Risk Description 
Very Low Risk The odds of a disruption are low but one might occur. 
Low Risk A disruption could happen at any time, and if it does it will be critical to mitigate any losses. 
Moderate Risk Port operators and authorities view this as an important factor; it will fail if a disruption occurs. 
High Risk 
Report incident immediately. Disruption to the supply chain will no doubt occur and will negatively influence international trade and 
port operations. Time is needed to conciliate. 
Source: Authors 
 
The findings are based on the risk table where each 
code represents a factor. They were placed in the 
table to identify which factor was more important 
and which would have the most consequences if 
ignored. Table 5 represents Port Klang’s risk level. 
Each key factor of the port was allocated a spot in the 
risk chart. It can be seen that D2 (X-ray machines are 
always utilised) is located within the very-low-risk 
section. Judging from the questionnaire, X-ray 
machines in Port Klang are underutilised, even 
though X-ray inspection became a mandatory factor 
of port standardisation. The port itself does not view 
it as a risk that the X-ray machines are not in use. 
Factors A1 (Maritime risk and control analysis is 
important in today's current global climate), C1 
(Constantly upgrade security network) and C4 
(Possibility of port IT system being hacked or 
disrupted) are important, and if overlooked they can 
cause disruptions to supply chains and operations to 
an immense degree. Port Klang has decided that 
these three factors weigh heavily in their minds as 
they rely on them in their day-to-day operations. In 
terms of viewing the importance of maritime risk and 
control, it is known that Port Klang is located very 
close to one of the most dangerous waterways in the 
world, the Strait of Malacca. Pirate attacks are known 
to occur within territorial waters. What is even more 
frightening is illegal boarding and hijacking of a 
docked ship, since it is easier to hijack a ship when it 
is not moving [26]. Assessing their risk and control 
analysis can provide the port with relevant statistics. 
As for Port Klang, the possibility of an attack on a 
ship is high. Accordingly, the port manager or port 
authority needs to create a contingency, mitigation or 
prevention plan. Having to rely on technology for 
everyday operations helps smoothen supply chain 
flows [38]. The possibility of ports and ships being 
hacked is still vague, and there have been very few 
cases. However, knowing that it is possible puts 
major ports in a position where they need to improve 
their IT systems. A modern terrorist might not 
necessarily carry a firearm, but with the right skills 
and a computer with Internet access, they can disrupt 
a port’s entire operation, halting transportation, 
disrupting navigation systems and causing delays 
which will result in an inefficient and slow flow of 
goods. The other two most important factors for Port 
Klang relate to its IT security. Port Klang views this 
factor as an important aspect for the port to operate 
properly and efficiently. Failing to implement 
technology can create the possibility of future 
disruptions. Most cranes and gates in Port Klang are 
remotely controlled. Someone hacking and taking 
control of cranes and gates could cause serious 
disruptions. 
 
Table 5. Risk assessment matrix for Port Klang  
 Frequency 
Strongly Disagree (1) Disagree (2) Neutral (3) Agree (4) Strongly Agree (5) 
Severity Negligible (1)      
Minor (2)  D2    
Moderate (3)   D4 C2 D3 A4  
Critical (4)   C3 B2 B4 A3 A2 B1 B3 D1  
Catastrophic (5)     A1 C1 C4 
Source: Authors 
Table 6. Risk assessment matrix for Port of Tanjung Pelepas  
 
Source: Authors 
  Frequency 
Strongly Disagree (1) Disagree (2) Neutral (3) Agree (4) Strongly Agree (5) 
Severity Negligible (1)           
Minor (2)           
Moderate (3)     A4 C2 D1 D2 D3 D4   
Critical (4)     B4 A2 A3 B1 B3 C3 B2 
Catastrophic (5)       A1 C1 C4 
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Table 6 shows the Port of Tanjung Pelepas’ risk 
level. It can be seen that every factor mentioned in 
the questionnaire is significantly important to their 
operations and security. The most important one is 
C4 (possibility of the port’s IT system being hacked 
or disrupted). Much like Port Klang, the port views 
this factor as an important basis for their operations. 
The Malaysian government realises that an attack 
which could disrupt supply chain or container flows 
would not necessarily come from terrorists or pirates 
but hackers, who can disrupt everyday operations. 
That is why the Port of Tanjung Pelepas views this as 
an important factor which could inevitably cause 
inconvenience to maritime trade if overlooked.  
Table 7 displays the Port of Singapore’s risk level. 
D4 (possibility of container theft or seal breakage) is 
low in this port, so it does not pose much of a risk to 
their operations. The Port of Singapore is known to 
be one of the best ports in the world, and therefore 
container theft or port crime is relatively low due to 
Singapore's strict laws, foreign regulations and 
security. A1 (Maritime risk and control analysis is 
important in today's current global climate) and C1 
(Constantly upgrade security network) are the most 
important factors for the Port of Singapore. In the 
current global environment, where terrorism and 
piracy continue to hold the power to negatively affect 
world trade, maritime risk and control are greatly 
needed to ensure the smooth flow and efficiency of 
supply chains and trade. Therefore, A1 was selected 
as an important factor which cannot be overlooked 
due to its ability to create catastrophic disruptions 
which will influence global trade. For C1, the Port of 
Singapore views this as an important factor which 
can cause severe disruptions when overlooked. As a 
modern port which relies heavily on modern 
technology, keeping the Port of Singapore’s IT 
system secure is a must if the port wishes to be 
efficient and on schedule, which in return will ease 
the movement of containers and the basic supply 
chain. The Port of Singapore is the world's second 
busiest port. In order to maintain its efficiency and 
improve operations, PSA Singapore invested in 22 
new automated guided vehicles/cranes with security 
integration to prevent hackers from hijacking their 
guided vehicles and have also made efforts to 
become one of the most technologically advanced 
ports in the world [39]. 
 
Table 7. Risk assessment matrix for Port of Singapore 
 Frequency 
Strongly Disagree (1) Disagree (2) Neutral (3) Agree (4) Strongly Agree (5) 
Severity Negligible (1)      
Minor (2)  D4    
Moderate (3)  C2 A4 D3  
Critical (4)  A2 A3 B1 B2 B3 B4 C3 D1 D2 
Catastrophic (5)    C4 A1 C1 
Source: Authors 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
Analysing the two Malaysian ports, Port Klang and 
the Port of Tanjung Pelepas, and the Port of 
Singapore provided a clear insight into Malaysia’s 
maritime supply chain security. All three ports 
indicated that government intervention in the safety 
and security of waterways would no doubt be enough 
to help protect and counter maritime crime. 
Government intervention might be very effective at 
eradicating piracy, but pirates are still very much 
active in the Strait of Malacca. The ISPS was 
developed specifically to protect the US, but also 
poses a positive externality by providing ports 
around the world with another layer of security. 
There is a debate on whether the ISPS can really 
prevent potential hijacks [40]; it can better secure 
ports, but also it was found that it is relatively 
difficult to protect inbound and outbound ships.  
The three port authorities agreed that when a 
disruption occurs it can be difficult to manage 
resources and recover. Having up-to-date machinery, 
software and security equipment can help prevent 
disruptions and mitigate losses. Disruptions in ports 
can create bottlenecks for the maritime supply chain 
industry resulting from inefficiency, slow supply 
chain flows and delayed transportation. The recovery 
time will depend on the severity of the damage. Port 
and anchorage crime is high in Malaysian ports, and 
these could be influenced by corruption, poor 
management and poor resource planning. There are 
some reports of corruption, such as selling 
identification cards and passports, which has existed 
in the immigration field for a long time. Malaysian 
ports located in the Strait of Malacca are always 
vulnerable to pirates. They have strengthened their 
partnerships with other nations to improve port 
security through the implementation of ISPS, C-
TPAT and the CSI. Maintaining partnerships with 
other nations may be enough for Malaysia to enhance 
their security, but investing in high-end security 
equipment and employing port personnel who 
integrate good faith with work ethics are advised. 
Information sharing is crucial to preventing security 
flaws or attacks that could jeopardise the entire 
industry. However, poor implementation could bring 
about a higher risk of attacks, as information may be 
sold to pirates [41]. Such activities will pose threats 
to shipping lanes, ships and crews. Regarding the 
possibility of container theft and seal breakages, Port 
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Klang was neutral and the Port of Tanjung Pelepas 
signified this as a significant threat. On the other 
hand, the Port of Singapore showed little concern 
about this issue. The Malaysian ports showed 
different perspectives on container theft due to their 
proximity to the Strait of Malacca. 
Given the TPP trade agreement and China’s claims to 
parts of the South China Sea, there will surely be 
uncertainty when it comes to the security of the 
waterways. Training and development for port 
employees is also needed, specifically in regard to 
ethics in the working environment and in the process 
of trying to reduce corruption. Piracy can be 
controlled through sharing intelligence/information, 
collaborating with neighbouring countries, increasing 
military spending and deploying more naval forces in 
the Strait of Malacca. The increase in international 
trade could attract pirate attacks that will disrupt the 
supply chains for Malaysia and other countries.  
The maritime security of Port Klang is related to 
various factors such as the utilisation of X-ray 
machines, which were found to be underutilised due 
to a lack of skilled employees. The global 
environment, frequent upgrades to security networks 
and the possibility of cyber-attacks on the port were 
also considered important to the maritime supply 
chain. The possibility of the IT system being 
disrupted was regarded as the most serious high-risk 
factor for the Port of Tanjung Pelepas. The Port of 
Singapore had strict security and regulations, and it 
abided by the ISPS Code. They have prepared for an 
increase in cyber threats and intend to protect their 
data, automated machines and operations, as they 
rely heavily on automated machines. Thus, upgrades 
to the port’s security networks are necessary to 
prevent unauthorised access to important 
information. Malaysia’s waterways are one of the 
most important trade routes for the maritime 
industry. Malaysia needs to increase its 
military/naval presence in the Strait of Malacca and 
parts of the South China Sea. Also, corruption needs 
to be eliminated to pave the way for information and 
intelligence sharing with neighbouring countries. 
One of the limitations of this research is that data 
were collected from only some of the ports located in 
the Strait of Malacca. Therefore, this study could be 
expanded on by future research that broadens the 
focus to other geographical locations, such as Africa.  
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